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Managerialism and the Demise of the Big Three 
 
By Robert R Locke 
Abstract:  This essay is about the crisis of US automobile management and the difficulties that 
management educators and practitioners in America have had facing up to that crisis.  It focuses on 
Detroit’s Big Three but it also looks at the role Japanese firms played in transferring JMS  (Japanese 
Management Systems) to America, particularly the transfer of TPS (the Toyota Production System) to 
Georgetown, Kentucky.  It  opens (I) with a discussion of the triumph of a science-based “New 
Paradigm” in business school management education and in industry, with reference to its critics, in 
order to establish the institutional framework within which US automobile management  expanded 
and operated after World War II; then (II) a more general discussion ensues in which U.S. 
managerialism and JMS are compared, and the pathways and barriers to the transfer of JMS to 
America both to US firms and to Japanese transplants are explored, before in the last part (III)  the 
focus narrows to a specific case of transfer: H. Thomas Johnson’s analysis of Toyota’s successful 
alternative Production System (TPS) at Georgetown and how it supersedes in theory and practice the 
managerial methods of the Big Three. 
 
Managerialism  --  What occurs when a special group, called management, ensconces itself 
systemically  in organizations and deprives owners and employees of decision-making power 
(including the distribution of emoluments) – and justifies the takeover on the grounds of the group’s 
education and exclusive possession of the codified bodies of knowledge and know-how necessary to 
the efficient running of organizations.  – Locke 1996 
 
I.  The Concept and Reality of US Management after World War II 
In 2008 Rakesh Khurana published a history of American business schools in which he wrote an 
excellent chapter about “Disciplining the Business School Faculty:  The Impact of the Foundations.” 
He was not the first to do so.  Robert R. Locke opened his 1989 book, Management and Higher 
Education Since 1940, with a chapter on a similar subject, in which he describes the creation of a 
“New Paradigm” in business studies, the application of science to the solution of managerial 
problems, which took shape during and in the decades immediately after WWII (“The New 
Paradigm”, 1-29).  Whereas Locke concentrated primarily on the development of Operations 
Research in industry and higher education including business schools, Khurana concentrated his story 
2 
 
on how a group of NGO bureaucrats (mainly from the Ford Foundation), in league with business 
school deans and corporation CEOs carried through a thorough transformation of business study 
programs and research agendas in the top twenty business schools of America.  Khurana’s study 
centers on the economists’ take-over of the business schools, after economics had itself been 
transformed into a “decision science” through its absorption of operations research techniques 
(mainly linear programming and mathematical modeling) from scientists working on government 
contracts at the Rand Corporation. J-C Spender (private communication 1.09.2009) calls the move of 
economists into prominent if not dominant positions in business schools  “an attempt to ‘colonize’ 
the social sciences – to elbow ‘real people’ out of the analysis and replace them by rational self-
maximizers”  -- those equipped “with the ‘rigorous’ thinking, of which economists believed they were 
the ‘high priests’.”  H. Thomas Johnson relates how this colonization in his field (management 
accounting) occurred: 
“Managerial uses of accounting information…probably emanated from one primarily underlying 
cause – namely, the growing use of quantitative economic abstractions in national government 
planning during the 1940s.  …It is not surprising, perhaps, that accounting professors in graduate 
business schools quickly saw an opportunity to capitalize on this belief in the merit of using economic 
statistics to run the national economy.  After World War II, professors of accounting and finance in 
graduate business schools such as Harvard, Chicago, and Columbia started to show corporate 
executives how to use their accounting information to plan and control business activities in the 
same way that economists were showing government administrators how to use national accounting 
statistics to plan and control affairs of a national economy.  In part this idea emanated from 
accounting professors who had received doctoral training in economics….But the idea also received 
impetus from accounting instructors, whose experience with wartime agencies had introduced them 
to advance use of operations research and mathematical economics….  Small wonder that 
immediately after World War II graduate business schools became immersed in ways to apply neo-
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classical economic models to accounting information in order to formulate a basis for decision 
making in business.” (Johnson & Bröms: 57). 
While “The New Paradigm” transformed business school education, in business and industry multi-
divisional forms of corporate organization burgeoned.  Although before 1940 most big firms were 
organized functionally (U form), a few (M form) firms had come into existence by the 1920s.  After 
WWII M form corporate organization structures multiplied at home and abroad.  The scholar who 
drew these developments to the attention of business historians, and transformed the subject of 
management studies (Alfred D. Chandler, Jr.) wrote a seminal article on the subject for a 1961 issue 
of the Business History Review, that is, just as M form structures consolidated their presence in the 
business world. (Chandler & Redlich) Thereafter, in a number of publications, including the Pulitzer-
Prize winning The Visible Hand (1977), Chandler established a towering reputation not only within his 
field but outside – among economists, and businessmen.  He contended that huge corporations 
escaped the fate of bigness, i.e., inefficiency, by establishing managerial hierarchies that used various 
managerial instruments to monitor operations and attain efficiency through cutting transaction 
costs.  The special feature of the M form corporation was the introduction of a top level of 
management to supervise divisions by using balance sheets and income statements to drive the 
activities of divisional managers.   
Finance and controller functions gained ascendency at every level of management.  So did the use of 
the new quantitative instruments that were being devised and taught in think tanks and business 
schools.  Johnson observed: 
“Given this circumstance, successful managers believed they could make decisions without knowing 
the company’s products, technologies, or customers.  They had only to understand the intricacies of 
financial reporting.  … [B]y the 1970s managers came primarily from the ranks of accountants and 
controllers, rather than from the ranks of engineers, designers, and marketers.  [This new managerial 
class} moved frequently among companies without regard to the industry or markets they served.  … 
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A synergistic relationship developed between the management accounting taught in MBA programs 
and the practices emanating from corporate controllers’ offices, imparting to management 
accounting a life of its own and shaping the way managers ran businesses.” (Johnson and Bröms: 57). 
Not everybody accepted the “New Paradigm” in management study and practice.  Locke 
pointed this out in the second chapter of his 1989 book (“The New Paradigm Revisited:” 30-
55).  He focused on Operations Research, noting that OR professors in business schools (e.g., 
Russell Ackoff at Wharton) had by the late 1970s pronounced the attempt to use 
mathematical modeling and linear programming in decision-making a failure. (Locke, 1989; 
Ackoff, 1978).  More importantly, doubters other than OR people began to gather in 
business schools proper.   In 1987 H. Thomas Johnson, who had worked with Chandler to 
describe the financial accounting systems developed for M Form companies (Johnson, 1978) 
and Robert Kaplan, a professor in the Harvard Business School, published a co-authored 
book that questioned that very management accounting, which was then as now being 
taught in business schools:  Relevance Lost, The Rise and Fall of Management Accounting.  
The Harvard Business Review dubbed the book one of the more significant published on 
business in the past seventy-five years.  Johnson carried the attack on management 
accounting forward in two subsequent books:  Relevance Regained (1992) and, with Anders 
Bröms, Profit Beyond Measure (2000), the latter of which dealt specifically with production 
process. 
Meanwhile, students of economics started to revolt against their professor who had been 
educated in the New Paradigm.   In June 2000, a group in Paris openly protested about the 
“knowledge censorship” that they experienced in their studies.  They explained in a public 
manifesto: 
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“Most of us have chosen to study economics so as to acquire a deep understanding of the 
economic phenomena with which the citizens of today are confronted.  But the teaching 
that is offered, that is to say for the most part neoclassical theory or approaches derived 
from it, does not generally answer this expectation.  Indeed, even when the theory 
legitimately detaches itself from contingencies in the first instance, it rarely carries out the 
necessary return to the facts.  The empirical side (historical facts, functioning of institutions, 
and study of the behavior and strategies of the agents…) is almost nonexistent.  
Furthermore, this gap in the teaching, this disregard for concrete realities, poses an 
enormous problem for those who would like to render themselves useful to economic and 
social actors.” (quoted in Fullbrook, 2003: 6)  
The French rebels called neoclassic economics “autistic,” meaning that it was cut off from 
the real world.  They named their movement, Post-Autistic Economics (PAE).  The manifesto 
of protest, published in Le Monde, gained the attention of the government, which promised 
investigations.  The French rebellion initiated a broad if thinly and unevenly spread 
international movement that involves mainly professional economists, with their own review 
(originally called the Post-Autistic Economics Review, now The New Economics Review), that 
soon gained over 8,000 subscribers. 
Although these publications reveal serious dissent in academia about the institutionalization 
of the New Paradigm developed in America postwar, mainline US business schools mostly 
ignore them.  They scarcely noticed the PAE movement.  Perhaps that was inevitable, 
because the protesters failed to present a strong alternative study program to which the 
disaffected could rally.  They simply ask for “a pluralism of approaches adapted to the 
6 
 
complexity of the objects and to the uncertainty surrounding most of the big questions in 
economics.” (Fullbrook, 2003: 6).  The feeble nature of this statement indicates just how 
complete the “New Paradigm’s” cognitive triumph has been.  No strong competing 
paradigms appeared to which the protesters could repair. 
Nor did the criticism of quantitative control methods open the ears and minds of academics 
in the American citadel.  Although Khruana thoroughly described the institutionalization of 
the New Paradigm in US business schools, he did not discuss the dissent.  He ignored Locke’s 
books, Johnson’s books, and did not mention Post-Autistic Economics in his bibliography or 
text, even though the critiques had been around for years before he wrote.  Unlike Locke in 
1989, Khurana in 2008 did not write a chapter on the “New Paradigm Revisited.” Rather in 
the book’s last section he shifts emphasis to a criticism of New Investor Capitalism and the 
effects that Chicago School economics have had on moral education in business schools. 
Johnson’s books amounted to a detailed examination of the Financial Accounting system 
that Chandler considered an essential part of the successful functioning of management 
hierarchies, specifically in M form companies.  The presence of Johnson’s imposing critique, 
however, did not prevent the Business History Review from issuing a special retrospective on 
Chandler’s work (Summer 2008), which amounted to hardly less than hagiography.  None of 
the implicit or explicit criticism of Chandler work was discussed or cited in the volume -- this 
more than twenty years after Johnson and Kaplan declared the management accounting 
systems taught in US business schools and extant in US corporations irrelevant, and eight 
years after Johnson and Bröms had described viable and successful alternatives to U.S. 
management accounting quantitative methods.  To issue a retrospective honoring the most 
significant business historian of the 20th century is not only acceptable but a proper thing for 
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business historians to do.  But a last chapter about Chandler and his critics should have been 
included to carry the appraisal of his life and work into the post-Chandlerian world.  
Moreover, If Chandler’s admirers could deal with his academic critics by simply ignoring 
them, Chandler’s work could not escape the critique of reality in the shape of Japanese 
Management Systems (JMS). (Liker, Fruin, & Adler: 5-25) 
II. Japanese Management Systems 
One might think that the Japanese would have set to work immediately after World War II 
emulating US management and management educational models.  Unlike the West 
Europeans, they did not increasingly accept the dominant American view that management 
had become an indispensable functional caste in society possessed of particular knowledge 
and talent, who attend business schools to learn a corpus of managerially useful subjects.    
To appreciate why, Westerns have to understand Japanese work ways, at first culturally, 
then in schools, then in the Japanese corporation.  
Culture. 
Scholars find the cooperative work practices employed in lean or “limited” manufacturing 
inherent in Japan’s wetland rice cultivation. (see Johnson & Bröms: 101-3, for an important 
distinction between Japanese “limited” production systems that are called “lean” production 
systems in the United States but differ from them.)  “Paddy cultivation,” Sjhuji Hayashi 
argued, “encouraged group endeavors in village (mura) life. …  The mura work is decided by 
the group as a whole.  Farmers work so close together that cooperation becomes second 
nature. … When paddy fields are irrigated water pumped in is allowed to flow by gravity, the 
entire village field is worked at the same time.  Even fertilizer had to be cooperatively 
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applied because the water flow carries it everywhere (Hayashi: 68).”  Dominique Turcq, 
using the same metaphor, notes that “Japanese culture is a culture of water.  The study of 
the Japanese economy cannot be based on structures but on the flows existing between 
these structures.” (Turcq: 55). 
Schools  
Other specialists observe how, despite changes in Japan brought on by Western emulation, 
group-process methods of work were taught in education.  William K. Cummings noted that 
Japanese teachers spend an inordinate amount of time at the beginning of the school year 
just establishing order in the classroom, so that learning subsequently can take place.  
“Classroom order,” Cummings affirmed, “is developed by having students cooperate in 
groups that prepare contributions for the rest of the class (Cummings: 150).”  Classrooms 
break into groups, with teachers sitting by rather unobtrusively.  Bright students work with 
slow learners whose performance they help raise to the group pace.  Teachers and 
administrators do not discipline individuals, by, say, sending a pupil to the office, but let the 
group to which the problem-pupil belongs decide and administer “punishment.”  Assertive 
discipline is “antithetical” to the Japanese style of student management.  Japanese teachers 
even at the preschool level defer discipline authority to pupils.  Small work groups are held 
collectively responsible for homework assignments, so that if a group member does not do 
this work the others receive demerits.  Groups are assigned tasks, sometimes too difficult to 
do, just to see how well they can handle them – they are stretched (Adams: 69). 
  
Within the system moral education is taught by experience as well as by precept.  The moral 
education furthers cooperative, family and community values.  Its chief aim is process-not-
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results-oriented.  Process involves a continuous change in time, a moving progressively from 
one point to another in a steady development towards a contemplated end.  Process 
education stresses the procedure through which results are obtained, not the results 
themselves.  W. Edwards Deming after working in Japan emphasized process as opposed to 
individual performance.  He advocated making improvement in the process in which the 
individual works, not trying to eliminate individual “mistakes” (Deming, 1982, 1986).  Kaoru 
Ishikara's famous fishbone diagrams used in Japanese manufacturing illustrate process 
orientation; they show the people involved how the entire process in which they work 
produces the results, so that they can learn to think of their work in terms of process 
improvement.  “Japanese educators,” Cummings remarked, “have never paid much 
attention to the innate abilities of learners.  They have tended to assume that anybody can 
learn a task given a determined effort. Process modes of education emphasize the process, 
not individual abilities, and are perfectly suited to group cooperative forms of education.” 
(Cummings: 150)  Process moral education differs profoundly from moral instruction in 
America.   
 
In other words, in a high-employee-dependent Japanese management system, management 
education takes place differently than in America.  It occurs cooperatively in the primary, 
intermediate, and secondary school system not in business schools. The point: If people wish 
to organize a work process in which the employees themselves manage it and are not 
“managed” by a group external to it, what happens in the Japanese class room is 
management education. 
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At the tertiary level Japan’s educational environment differed as well.  Most rich and 
powerful NGOs and businessmen that wish to call on society to fulfill a need, usually find a 
way to achieve their ends.  This happened in the US when rich businessmen endowed 
business schools in famous universities.  After WWII Japanese employer associations 
repeatedly asked for more and better higher education in Japan.  They asked for scientists, 
engineers, computer specialists, for the creation of technical research facilities and for the 
establishment of closer cooperation between universities and industry.  But the words 
“academic management education” seldom appeared in these requests.  Since business and 
industrial spokesmen presented no real and persistent demand for this education no 
American style managerial education of the MBA business school type materialized (Locke, 
1996).   
This does not mean that Japanese firms did not want to hire educated people.  They did, but 
they were much less interested in recruiting specialists in management subjects than people 
right out of college who had a liberal education in elite universities, because they did not 
intend to incorporate them into management systems like those being created in big US 
corporations. 
In the firm. 
American M form corporations were (are?) pyramidal organizations; they hire people into a 
hierarchy of management and, when applicable, union approved job classification on the 
factory floor.  In management the firms employ specialists at the entry and advanced levels 
in order to fill the manpower requirements listed in corporate organizational charts.  The 
workforce and management consists of a web of skills that can be maintained from 
institutions of higher education, i.e., business schools, and from manpower markets inside 
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(bulletin board open-job postings) or outside the firm, by fitting people into slots like 
interchangeable parts. 
Johnson and Bröms despised these lifeless pyramidal structures imposed on work processes 
and managed by computer-oriented-production-control and expert-run cost accounting 
systems: 
“At first the abstract information compiled and transmitted by these computer systems 
merely supplemented the perspectives of managers who were already familiar with concrete 
details of the operations they managed, no matter how complicated and confused those 
operations became.  Such individuals, prevalent in top management ranks before 1970 had a 
clear sense of the difference between ‘the map’ created by abstract computer calculations 
and “the territory’’ that people inhabited in the workplace.  Increasingly after 1970, 
however, managers lacking in shop floor experience or in engineering training, often trained 
in graduate business schools, came to dominate American and European manufacturing 
establishments.  In their hands the “map was the territory.”  In other words, they considered 
reality to be the abstract quantitative models, the management accounting reports, and the 
computer scheduling algorithms….” (p. 23) 
“Japanese companies…,” James Abegglen and George Stalk, Jr. wrote, “differ significantly 
from the Western pattern.  The essence of the Japanese company is the people who 
compose it.  It does not, as the American firm, belong to the stockholders and the managers 
they employ to control it, but it is under the control of the people who work in it, who pay 
limited attention to stockholder’s wishes.  The company personnel, including directors who 
are themselves life-time employees and executives of the company, are very much part of 
the company.” (Abegglen & Stalk, 1988: 184).  In Japanese corporations core employees as 
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distinguished from temporary employees are not recruited as skills but as people whose 
chief qualification must be a capacity to assimilate quickly the corporate work culture and 
production systems.  Recruited employees are assumed to have no firm-and-job-specific 
skills.  That is why firms spend so much money on in-house training and engages in job 
rotation and multi-skilling.   
They allot great resources to core employee training because they expect them to stay with 
the firm.  Upper level positions when they fall vacant are not replenished from an external 
job market but from within the firm. To separate out a special group called management, 
that is dedicated exclusively to serving its own interests (separate from the employees) and 
the interests of those who do not work in the firm (the stockholders in large public 
corporations), and who have developed financial-results-oriented management techniques 
to do so, does not conform to the traditional Japanese conception of the firm. 
However, to say that American corporations and Japanese firms developed different 
management systems does not prove that one was more efficient than the other, or that 
even if they desired to do so American firms could import JMS and if they tried could 
succeed better with them in their endeavor than with their own, or that Japanese firms 
needed to transfer their management systems to their transplants in America in order to 
operate successfully in the US management context.  Two factors, the technology involved in 
production and the managerial wherewithal of U.S. and Japanese firms, determined the 
desirability and the extent to which JMS could be imported and successfully operated into 
the United States.     
Limited Transfer:  The Japanese Consumer Electronics Industry 
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Martin Kenney reports that the first Japanese industrial success story occurred in consumer 
electronics. In Japan, Hitashi, Toshiba, JVC, Matsushita, Sanyo, Sharp, and Sony operated 
factories with the same JMS features as other Japanese firms.  (Kenney, 1999: 262).  Surveys 
in the 1990s reported that consumer electronic product firms in Japan had created seniority 
based salary schedules, long-term employment, and enterprise unions.  In production 
management they used JIT, had strong commitments to training in general and regularly 
used on-the-job training through job rotation in particular (Jenkins & Florida, 1999: 264-65).  
They enjoyed very low-labor turnovers and worked in groups and teams throughout the 
industry.  Front line workers worked in job design and control, which in the US would have 
been “the purview of management and other professional employees.” (Jenkins & Florida, 
1999: 264-65).  And regular male workers were involved in “setting standard process times, 
spearheading operations improvement, and conducting performance evaluations,” jobs 
reserved for engineers and managers in U.S. firms. (Ibid., 263).  The first significant 
transplants to America happened in this industry with the establishment of Japanese 
television assembly factories in America during the 1970s.  By “1998 Japanese companies 
owned all the remaining television assembly factories operating in the United States.” 
(Kenney, 1999: 257). 
If Alfred D. Chandler, Jr.’s admiration of management at GM is out of place in the late 20th 
century, his general insight that different technologies produce different strategies and 
managerial structure is still correct. Although domestic Japanese consumer electronic plants 
and Japanese automobile factories used similar management systems, technical specs during 
production were different. Kenney’s study comparing Japanese television assembly 
transplants to Japanese automobile transplants, pointed out that for technical reasons 
“automobile manufacturing spent less on R&D than consumer electronics, had lower 
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engineer to operator ratios, had lower automation, [and] used many more parts in assembly 
(30 to 40,000 to less than 2,000) in much longer assembly lines (1 kilometer to 100 meters).  
Assembly time in an automobile factory per unit ran from 10-20 hours compared to 27 
minutes in a television assembly plant.  The role of operators was much greater in 
automobile assembly than in television production; automobile manufacturing required 
more on-the-job training and more interactive work.  Automobile production technology 
needed employees with more interrelation skills. (Kenney: 273).  To achieve results Japanese 
automobile transplants had to absorb more of the JMS from home than Japanese 
transplants in consumer electronics – and they did.  Kenney stated: 
“the television transplants…all operated in a style far closer to that of U.S. factories than of 
Japanese factories.  Even the companies, such as Sanyo, that consciously tried to introduce a 
Japanese-like system soon retreated and accepted the U.S. system.  …. (p. 286)   U.S. 
television assembly transplants diverged far more from their respective sister plants in Japan 
than auto assembly transplants did from theirs.  Not only have they diverged in terms of 
management and production systems, but they have differed in the apparent eagerness or 
ability on the part of management to facilitate operator-and-factory-based knowledge 
creation.” (p, 287). 
Limited Transfer:  The Big Three Firms 
Twenty-five years after Japanese firms began transplant operations in North America, just 
before the bankruptcy of two of the Big Three and near collapse of the other in 2008-2009, 
their performance looked like this (Table 1). 
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----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 1: 2006.  Source:  Schifferes: 5 
  
Sales 
(units) 
Sales ($bn) Profit ($bn) Market Value ($bn) Workforce 
GM 8.3m 191 -10.9 20 335.000 
Toyota 8.2m 176 +12.5 208     285.000 
Ford 6.6m 153 -12.7 16 300.000 
Volkswagen 5.2m 118 +5.2 43 344.000 
Daimler/Chrysler 4.8m 185 -1.7* 65 382.000 
*The losses occurred at Chrysler . 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------   
 
The fact that Table I shows dismal results indicates that US firms never successfully met the 
competitive challenge.  Why?   
It could not be from ignorance about Japanese Management Systems (JMS).  Ronald Dore 
first drew the West’s attention to Japanese manufacturing in 1973.  Robert Lutz, head of 
Ford’s operations in Europe and now a Vice-President at GM, sent scores of his people to 
Japan in 1979 to study production methods.  GM entered into a joint-agreement with Toyota 
(New United Motor Manufacturing, NUMMI) in 1984 in order to introduce already 
acknowledged superior Toyota production methods into its operations at a plant in Fremont, 
California.  GM managers trained at NUMMI brought lean production to Opel, especially in 
its new greenfield site in Eisenach, Germany.  Studies about Japanese lean production 
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multiplied throughout the 1980s (700 articles were published in the US on JIT between 1985 
and 1990), culminating in the universally touted book by J.F. Womack, D.T. Jones, and D. 
Roos, The Machine That Changed the World (1990).   The studies about efforts to transfer 
JMS to the US continued to blossom in the 1990s, after the Japanese economy quit growing 
and Americans could stop admiring them.  (See a collection of articles in Jeffrey K. Liker, W. 
Mark Fruin and Paul S. Adler, eds. Remade in America:  Transplanting & Transforming 
Japanese Management Systems,1999, published by Oxford University Press in its Japan 
Business and Economics Series. 
Barriers to transfer 
Shorage of Time.  If alarmed U.S. automobile manufacturers learned a lot about JMS, they, 
paradoxically, delayed implementation.  Incredulous at first, the world’s greatest automobile 
manufacturers found it hard to believe c. 1980 that they had anything to learn from the 
Japanese about how to design and manufacture automobiles for Americans.  They found 
every reason to explain their problems except inferior shop floor production and corporate 
governance systems [cheap labor in Japan, expensive labor in America, government CAFÉ 
standards (that US firms actually avoided), the unions, high overhead costs caused by 
generous medical insurance benefits and retirement plans (that the firms were rapidly 
cutting)}.  
 
Almost five hundred years ago, Niccolo Machiavelli wrote this about change: 
“There is nothing more difficult to carry out, nor more doubtful of success, nor more 
dangerous to handle than to initiate a new order of things.  For the reformer has enemies in 
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all who profit from the old order, and only lukewarm defenders in all those who would profit 
by the new order.  This lukewarmness arises partly from fear of their adversaries, who have 
the law in their favor, and partly from the incredulity of mankind who do not truly believe in 
anything new until they have had actual experience of it. (The Prince, 1513) 
 
Like most men and women being driven relentlessly into a corner, Big Three automakers 
temporized.  They “knew about Japanese Production Systems for at least fifteen years 
before they made serious efforts at…implementation” of JMS (Liker, Fruin,& Adler: 10). 
Barriers posed by Big Three management structures and practices. 
The very structure and practice of US automobile governance systems that JMS were to 
replace frustrated the replacement. 
Workforce resistance. 
J.-C. Spender states that the automobile industry “has been consistently successful at 
achieving dominance over its work force.” (Spender: 136).  Blue collar workers in the 
American system of industrial relations fought hard to protect their interests. The 
adversarial relationship was part of firm governance.  
In the hard struggles between management and labor in the US automobile industry, unions 
hammered out collective bargaining agreements, protecting job classifications, with 
different skills and pay gradients on the factory floor (on the average 45 job classifications 
per plant in 1989).  (Pil & MacDuffie: 43). 
This affected implementation of job rotation, multiple skilling, and group work practices that 
were necessary to a well-functioning work process modeled on JMS.  By contrast, Japanese 
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home plant had on average five job classification for production workers and five for 
maintenance workers.  Japanese transplants in the US had only one job classification for 
production workers and one or two for maintenance workers.  Because workers and their 
unions were scared opponents of change, US manufacturers only managed to reduce the 
average number of job classifications on factory floors from 45 for production workers in 
1989 to 37 in 1994 (Adler: 89).   
Nor did the American firms eliminate status distinctions between blue and white collar 
workers in their plants, which disappeared in Japan after World War II.  The elimination of 
blue-white-collar differentiation along with so many job skill classifications is considered to 
be essential to well-functioning JMS whose essence is solidarity and common purpose. 
Resistance in management.  Beyond blue collars, opposition to JMS arose on-and-off the 
factory floor primarily within the ranks of American automobile management itself.  For 
managers, JMS transfer raised bread and butter issues.  
In the US system managers held power and were (are) reluctant to relinquish it.  Many of the 
agency, property rights, and transaction costs models used in Big Three governance did (do) 
not fit with the JMS:  Management and unions are not determined adversaries, and 
asymmetries between managers and employees in terms of voice, rights, and benefits are 
significantly muted. (Liker, Fruin, & Adler: 10). 
JIT production methods were “dramatically opposed to the economic order and guiding 
principles of American manufacturing and to reliance on technologies such as MRP II for 
shop floor scheduling.” (Liker, Fruin, & Adler: 10).  In America “only engineering experts 
could develop scientifically accurate work methods” (Ibid).  In America job design and quality 
control were traditionally the tasks of management.    
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In the JMS, on the other hand, engineers have always worked closely with line workers in 
running the production process.  Japanese supervisors know all the jobs in their jurisdictions 
in detail and are generally selected as supervisors because they were the best operators. The 
adoption of JMS required a plant environment significantly “less autocratic and more 
participative than has been the norm on Big Three factory floors (Brannen, Liker, Fruin: 144).   
In Big Three Middle Management there was not only a “lukewarmness” in will to effect this 
change but a lack of capacity. American managers did not have a lot of experience on the 
floor and, accordingly, had not traditionally contributed much to shop floor efficiency 
through hands-on work with line employees, but these were just the talents needed to 
transfer JMS to US factories.  
Finally, management separated from the work force in U.S. automobile firms was 
accustomed to using and hearing a language of command.  Philippe d’Iribarne observed that 
Classical American Management…”operates on the following behavioral principles:  to define 
precisely and explicitly the responsibilities of each person, formulate his/her objectives 
clearly, give the person freedom in the choice of methods for meeting objectives, evaluate 
the results carefully, and reward or sanction the person according to his/her successes or 
failures.” (Iribarne: 131).  These principles call for a management where a “high degree of 
formalization, standardization, and centralization” reigns, where managers possess good 
conflict-resolution skills, “good top-down decision making abilities,” “good problem solving 
analytical skills, and a capacity to devise good externally imposed evaluation systems”  This is 
Taylorism par excellence.  
JMS required group-oriented consensus-making, the cultivation of relational skills, and tacit 
learning, the kind that Ikujiro Nonaka and Hirotake Takeuchi describe in their 1995 book on 
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“The Knowledge-Creating Company.” Tacit knowledge is difficult to transfer and imbibe; 
especially when the recipients are Americans who are use to speaking explicitly in directives, 
and do not spend time socially with co-workers.  To the extent that the JMS required 
American managers to impart tacit knowledge, the glue of the Japanese system, into 
American owned companies, transfer could only partially succeed. 
Restraints of Finance. Another factor limiting the transfer of JMS to the Big Three is the 
greater financial environment in which management in the US firms operated.   Although 
American automobile makers could not control this environment, the firms mostly thrived in 
it for seventy-five years. They raised huge amounts of capital from banks and from the sale 
of stocks and bonds brokered in Wall Street’s financial firms.  Events in late 20th century 
finance, however, proved detrimental.   
 
One was the revolt of the stockholders against the executive boards and top management 
that accompanied declining profits.  Suffering from negative or limited incomes over 
multiple years, US firms were often cash-strapped compared to their cash-flush Japanese 
rivals.  Boards resorted to cutting costs (investments in R&D, cuts in workers’ wages and 
benefits, reductions of dividends) that led to serious long-term declines in firms’ market 
value (See Table 1) and a precipitous fall in the prices of company stocks.  
This provoked stockholders discontent in favor of greater returns on their investments. As 
proprietary firms, that is, firms where owners elect board members and major owners sit on 
them, the stockholders could give voice to their concerns.  At General Motors, for example, 
the billionaire outsider Kirk Kerkorian, who sat on the board but never worked in the firm, favored 
harsh restructuring to increase payouts to investors, including the sale of high-value company assets, 
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like GMAC, which could have brought a windfall profits to a stockholder like Kerkorian, but could 
have also left the company without the wherewithal in the future to finance the sale of its vehicles or 
the cash to implement the transfer of JMS.  The financial system is currently driving the 
dismantlement of the companies through the sell-off of their high value assets piece by piece. 
 
Considering the existential nature of the threat, U.S. automobile firms inadequately 
assimilated JMS.  As Liker, Fruin, and Adler put it in 1999 (p. 28): 
“The American companies that adopt Japanese practice, do not go quite so far and do not 
get quite the performance [as Japanese transplants].  The Big Three do not put the same 
effort into training and socializing,…and do not reach performance levels of their Japanese 
competitors in Japan or North America.” 
Maximum Transfer:  Japanese Transplants in America 
Japanese Transplants have not suffered recently like the Big Three in their greater 
institutional environment at home or in North America.  They returned steady profits; they 
received subsidies from local communities to entice them to build plants located on 
greenfield sites; and they operated in a more favorable home financial environment.  In 
Japanese firms, Joann Müller reminds us, “workers and the company itself are the de facto 
beneficiary owners” (Müller:1).  Automobile stock is primarily in the hands of customer or supplier 
firms with which the automobile firms do business.  These corporate stockholders do not much care 
about high dividends or share prices (they rarely sell the stock). They profit as companies primarily 
through expanded business opportunities with the automobile company in which they hold stock.  
Since major stockholders are not interested particularly in high stock prices or dividends, Japanese 
automobile management policymakers can stress the long-term expansion of market share, which is 
essential to globalizing lean production, and re-invest profits into improved competence rather than 
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pay out higher dividends. And they can tap funds to carry out their plans from banks in their 
industrial group (kereitsu) if the cash accumulated through years of very profitable operations is 
insufficient for planned expansions.  
In America, moreover, Japanese transplants better cultivate fruitful relations with their suppliers in 
order to facilitate the transfer JMS. 
One example:  MacDuffie and Helper’s study of Honda’s efforts, compared to Ford’s, to work 
up an efficient supply chain.  A quality expert at an American supplier firm that works with 
both Honda and Ford commented: 
 
“Honda cares about making the part fit the car, while Ford cares about making the part fit 
the blueprint.  During product launch, Honda takes parts as soon as they are made and runs 
back to try them on the car.  Then they tell us to change this, change that.  Ford usually isn’t 
here during our trials.  They just want to be sure that we are meeting the spec.  If there is a 
problem, they eventually issue an engineering change.  But at Honda, the change happens in 
a matter of days.  At first we thought they were nuts. But theirs is a great way to do 
business.  You get what you want – a part that works on the vehicle – right away.  Everything 
else ---like whether the blueprint is up-to-date – is secondary.  Initially, it was incredibly 
frustrating because Honda was so detail-oriented and wanted responses from us 
immediately. But I find they are almost always right.” (Quoted in MacDuffie & Helper: 168). 
Japanese firms customarily include workers on team involved in the transfer of technology.  
Even before WWII when Japanese sought to learn about scientific management in America, 
they included workers in the learning process because they knew that they would have to 
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work closely with them in implementation.  Okiie Yamashita, who chaired the Production 
Management Committee in 1938, observed that 
“workers ,in Japan- were accepted as co-researchers in a work study [about the transfer of 
Taylorism to Japan].”  In the selection of survey participants, it was considered necessary not 
to choose just “first class men,” i.e., management people, but to choose those who would be 
readily accepted by coworkers.  “This was, it was understood, because there was a need to 
see to it that the results of work study would be acceptable to a broad segment of workers 
*who would work with the managers to implement it+.”  Such sensitivity to the views of 
coworkers about the transfer of scientific management to Japan was “in line with the reality 
of Japanese industry.” (Yamashita, Quoted in Okuda, 1989, 195-96). 
Japanese automobile transplants worked with liaison teams in “sister” plants at home to 
which the Americans hired in the transplants were sent to learn about the company’s 
production management system, and from which expatriates were sent to the transplant to 
participate in the transfer of technology and work processes.  Japanese transplants have been 
careful to eschew American management culture, since to the Japanese the ethos of US industrial 
relations is unsuitable for JMS.  Japanese transplant managers interviewed in the 1990s criticized 
American managers for their lack of “commitment” and their abuse of power.  They complain about 
the US managers’ weak loyalty to their companies, about their high salary claims, and about their 
inability to forget “Fordist” modes of command-management.  Martin Kenney and Richard Florida in 
their book about Japanese transplants emphasize this point. “In nearly every plant we visited, 
Japanese managers voiced concern about the manner by which American managers operate.  An 
executive at Honda of America told us that his greatest problem was teaching American managers 
the Honda way” (Kenney and Florida:  287).   
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Fritz K. Pil and John Paul MacDuffie concluded from their study of Japanese automobile 
transplants “that [through JMS their performances] are approaching those of their sister 
plants in Japan and thus show that national, cultural, and institutional boundaries, are not 
insurmountable obstacles.” (Pil & MacDuffie, 1999: 68; Also, MacDuffie & Helper, 1997).  
III. H. Thomas Johnson’s Analysis of the TPS at Georgetown 
In order to more clearly explain that the Japanese opened a new era in the management of 
complex process manufacturing, the focus now narrows to one plant:  Toyota’s main US 
facility in Georgetown, Kentucky.  To avoid disputes about how much the contents of TPS 
differ from JMS (Liker, Fruin, & Adler: 4-6) let it simply be that they are quite similar and 
both “refer to the family of production, factory, and corporate management practices found 
in world-class Japanese firms.” (p. 4)  In Johnson’s view, moreover, TPS at Georgetown does 
not warrant such comparisons, because he considers it to be an archetypal process- 
management system beyond nationalist nomenclature that has replaced, on efficiency and 
moral grounds, a once triumphant American system of managerialism in the automobile 
industry, and elsewhere.  
Like Chandler, Johnson thinks systemically, but whereas Chandler contemplated how 
strategy affects management structures and practice, Johnson and Toyota think about how 
relationships in the work process determine efficiency. 
The issue here is the mass production of automobiles.  In America the pace setter, Henry 
Ford, erected a showcase plant at the River Rouge to minimize waste and maximize output 
and profits through a closely coordinated production system.  “Ford’s River Rouge plant,” in 
Johnson’s words,  
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“worked like clockwork to make a standardized product:  *He+ spoke proudly of turning iron 
ore, silica, and latex into finished vehicles in less than three and a half days, at the lowest 
cost in the world (Johnson, 1992: 37).  The continuous, linked production in the River Rouge 
factory required that every process operate virtually at the same balanced rate, which could 
best be achieved by making one uniform product. (Johnson, 1992: 38).   
But after WWII customers wanted a variety of products.  So American engineers and 
production managers, in order to cope with the complexity of assembling a variety of 
vehicles in one plant…”decoupled the line,” which “allowed different processes to operate at 
independent rates.”  They created inventory buffers to handle the imbalances appearing 
between the decoupled processes.  “Henry Ford did not require inventory buffers at the 
River Rouge in the early 1920s. Most American manufacturing plants could not operate 
without such buffers by the end of the 1950s” (Johnson, 1992: 38). 
Figure 1 portrays how the Big Three produced variety in a decoupled, long-run batch 
manufacturing process. After the initial production runs the semi-finished products were 
warehoused until they were needed in the batch production vehicles that were finished and 
sent on to the dealers.  The decoupling of production flows to obtain variety required the 
creation of a management Information system that could coordinate overall the now 
decoupled production process.     
Through the costs of warehousing, costs of personnel in Information management (whose 
numbers could exceed the workers and managers directly involved in work process), and the 
cost of equipment that sustained information management flows (mainframe computers 
and supplies) “overhead” costs in a Decoupled Batch Manufacturing Plant mushroomed.  
Management sought to pay for these “overheads” by utilizing the system of quantitative 
control  and reporting measures it had devised, imposed and operated in an Information 
System outside the work process to speed up throughput in each detached production 
segment, thereby supposedly obtaining huge savings from volume production.  
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History is replete with irony; at the time Alfred D.Chandler Jr.’s big, attractive idea was 
formulated, it had in process manufacturing become managerially anachronistic; few, 
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however, perceived it.  He and the US system of management education (and American 
management experience itself) had indoctrinated people in the West with the belief that 
managers are a special caste within society, verging on a profession (which they had never 
been) that acquired knowledge and skills about the management task in MBA courses.  A 
vast literature about the growth of management and management education, on both sides 
of the Atlantic, bases its treatment of the expansion of modern management and 
management education on these assumptions.   
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Johnson refers to Big Three management in these “decoupled” production plants as 
“Management by Results.’  Headquarters sets financial targets for each part of the 
corporation, then compels lower managers to meet them.  He refers to Toyota management 
of the work process as Management by Means (Johnson & Bröms: Chapters 2 & 3).  
Just as Chandler thought Management by Results is achieved with the tools of science – 
through the quantification of business studies and management methods, so does Johnson 
believe that Management by Means at Toyota is grounded in science. But the science is not 
Chandler’s.  Johnson’s reflections on work process efficiency have in fact been heavily 
influenced by E. Edwards Deming (Deming, 1982, 1986) and by work in modern physics and 
biology (see, Fritjof Capra, 1982, Locke, 1996) that has epistemologically undermined the 
Cartesian-Newtonian world view, upon which the “New Paradigm” in Management studies 
(with its emphasis on measurement and qualification) rests.   Out went measurement, in 
came references to the three principles that characterize the efficient “operation of all 
natural living systems in the universe (Johnson & Bröms: 73): 
“1. Self-Organization:  Creative energy continually and spontaneously materializing in self-
organizing forms that strive to maintain their unique self-identity. …. 
 2.  Interdependence: Interdependent natural systems interacting with each other through a 
web of relationships that connects everything in the universe, relationships, which express 
the essential nature of reality (everything exists ‘in the context of something else’) 
 3.  Diversity:  resulting from the continual interaction of unique identities always related to 
one another.” 
Johnson does not claim that Toyota is a “living natural system,” but he does claim that the 
TPS is isomorphic to one.   In the TPS employees on the line do not need management to 
28 
 
control the process from outside.  Control is systemic.  He remarked, after thoroughly 
studying the Georgetown Kentucky Plant, that Toyota “does not rely on internal shop floor 
control systems, such as MRP (Material Requirements Planning) to manage the flow of work 
in production.  Toyota does not drive operations with statistical controls, standard cost 
variance, or any similar information from accounting or production control sources, which is 
standard procedure in Big Three Plants.”  (p. 105).  The financial executive at Toyota 
Kentucky says, Johnson reported, that ‘the company never had nor does it intend to have a 
standard cost accounting system that provides cost and variance information for controlling 
operations.” (p. 110).  Then, how was production controlled?  The answer: As in a self-
organizing, interdependent, diverse living natural system, by the TPS’s work process itself – 
“real time by line workers as part of direct work that is done to make every vehicle.” (p. 
111). 
 
Toyota followed the example of Ford’s River Rouge plant in order to achieve the benefits of 
nonstop, continuous flow volume production.  To satisfy demand the company had to inject 
product variety into Ford’s single product line.  And to introduce variety into a continuous 
flow production plant, Toyota had to avoid the long down times needed to change dyes for 
different models and the stockpiling on the line of the huge number of parts that variety 
production required but a continuous flow process could not tolerate. 
There is no need to describe the now famous techniques that Toyota incorporated into its 
production line to achieve steady cuts in the waste of material and time that permitted 
continuous flow production to include variety.  Suffice it simply to name some of them found 
at the Georgetown facility:  Takt time production (so many seconds per vehicle), 
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standardized work, Jidoka (the Andon stop cord), Just in Time delivery from suppliers in and 
outside the factory (only the necessary product, at the necessary time, in the necessary 
quantities), Heijunka (level sequencing of production), continuous improvement, Total 
Quality Control, and Kanban. 
In a complex continuous flow process, to use these techniques efficiently did not require 
honing individual skills but cultivating relationships, through group work, job rotation, and 
learning of work standards, so that the employees on line could readily recognize bad work, 
poor quality and defective products and quickly intervene during the production process 
itself to assure quality and correct improper work. 
So it is the collective motivation and organizational learning capacity of people running the 
techniques not the techniques proper that matters.  For instance, at Toyota’s plant in 
Georgetown workers on the assembly line pull the cord to stop production 2,000 times a week in 
order to correct defects themselves.  In contrast, workers at Ford’s truck factory in Dearborn, 
Michigan, which installed Toyota’s Andon Stop Cord, (ostensibly to let the workers on the line as in 
Georgetown improve quality and eliminate defects themselves), “pull the cord only twice a week – 
the legacy of generations of mistrust between shop-floor workers and managers” (Schifferes: 1).  
Trust is based on a moral order in the firm, which resides in the inner self of employees.  Such a 
moral order is absent in the Big Three because management-devised control and surveillance 
systems typical of managerialism left a legacy of fear and conflict between management and 
employees in factories.  On-line workers at Ford also do not pull the cord because they are use to 
outside maintenance people and managers correcting defects, are not schooled in including 
correction of defects as part of their work repertoire, do not know process work standards 
sufficiently to be able quickly to identify system faults, and fear being blamed personally for the 
defect to which pulling the cord draws attention. 
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Johnson  and Bröms refer to operations in the TPS as Management by Means, wherein 
management does not concentrate on the results (as in the Big Three) but wherein all plant 
employees work together to perfect the means (the production process) that creates the 
results. If the means are in order, the results are automatically excellent. 
 They juxtaposed a list of phases that contrast behavioral traits suited to Big Three 
manufacturing and the Toyota Production System (pp. 186-87): 
 
Big Three      TPS 
The “I” stands alone     Relationships are reality 
Control the result     Nuture relationships 
Follow finance-driven rules    Master life-oriented practices 
Manipulate output to control costs   Provide output as needed on time 
Increase speed of work    Change how work is done 
Specialize and decouple processes   Enhance continuous flow 
An individual is the cause: blame   Mutual interaction is the cause: reflect  
        
Was this management?  Not in the Chandlerian sense or in the sense understood by 
purveyors of the “New Paradigm” in management education.  But Management by Means 
produced much better results.   
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Conclusion 
Robert Cole wrote in 1999 that about 1980 “enormous uncertainty gripped” top US 
managers (Cole: 203).  They feared that the Japanese “had developed a large competitive 
advantage” in manufacturing.  What could explain the cause of the problem facing American 
industry Cole had them ask. 
“Was it quality?” 
“Was it productivity?” 
“Was it low-paid workers, and/or cheap capital?” 
“Was it unfair Japanese government support for their competitors (the Japanese)?” 
“Was it a combination of factors?” (p.203) 
It is instructive that none of the questions that Cole said top managers asked in 1980, nor 
the topics that Cole suggested himself in 1999, included “Was it systemic U.S. management 
failure?” Most Americans on main street, in leadership positions, or in mainline business 
schools would not have answered “Yes,” then or today.  But this essay about 
“managerialism” in the Big Three has answered in the affirmative. 
Not that the distress the Big Three faced in 2008-09 was entirely the managers’ fault.  In “normal” 
times, automakers with serious money problems could have turned to Wall Street to find the cash 
needed to fund continuing operations and probably have gotten it.  But the world-wide collapse and 
subsequent paralysis of the financial system created exceptional times, which prevented top Big 
Three management from appealing successfully to shaken financial institutions for the 
money to get them through a severe liquidity crisis.  In the long run, however, the financial 
crisis of 2008-09 was just a final episode.  The Big Three’s fall really resulted from managers’ 
failure to meet the JMS challenge at factory floor and corporate levels, and completely end 
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the “Fordist” production regime.  The source of that failure was the systemic inadequacies of 
U. S. managerialism that have been described here.  Imprisoned in a management system in 
which they were the chief beneficiaries, trained to it in their skills, predilections, and modes 
of thinking, and lacking the skills and aptitudes necessary to running JMS, Big Three 
management was too lukewarm about the need to pursue the implementation of JMS in 
their own firms to carry transfer through energetically and effectively. 
Of course, U.S. companies survive and thrive because managerialism is not co-extensive with 
American management.  At the time U.S. firms failed to match Japanese managed 
transplants in transferring JMS in traditional staple U. S. industries (automobiles, steel, 
rubber, consumer electronics, machine tools, etc.), American entrepreneurs, participating in 
intricate webs of entrepreneurship located in complex regional habitats, carried through a 
new industrial revolution in Information Technology that spawned another generation of 
icon US firms (Microsoft, Intel, Oracle, Hewlett-Packard, etc.) (Saxanian, 1994, Best, 2001, 
Locke & Schöne, 2004).  Once again, it amounted to a case of new technologies generating 
different managerial strategies and structures.   
 
Within US firms, however, nothing entirely escapes the heritage of managerialism.  As start-
ups in IT mature, the entrepreneurial pioneers are sloughed off in boardrooms, to be 
replaced by MBA managers trained in the values and techniques of the New Paradigm.  Even 
where quite successful U.S. IT companies have borrowed JMS techniques the habits of 
managerialism have frustrated the borrowing. For example, Hewlett-Packard management, 
operating by MBO, a results oriented system, refused to transfer quality assessment 
techniques (boshin planning) that had crystallized in Japan in the 1970s and within HP’s own 
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Japanese subsidiary, until the 1990s, despite the subsidiary’s urgings, because HP U.S. 
managers evaluated the implementation of the system in terms of Management by Results 
accounting, i. e., “financial performance.” (Cole, 1999: 226). 
Finally, the behavior and thinking of managerialism is responsible for the recent financial 
debacle that brought a cascade of firms including Two of the Big Three down.  Unless the 
mathematicians in business schools had devised the financial instruments, “the abstract 
quantitative models,” the fruit of “The New Paradigm,” that bankers and brokers leveraged 
and sold to investors world-wide, they could not have exposed their institutions to such 
systemic risk and failure.  Unless greedy brokers and top managers separated their interests 
from those of their clients and the general public (which is managerialism), they would not 
have pressed the sale of the mathematically contrived securities so relentlessly.   
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